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Dizionario gramsciano / Gramsci dictionary: Hegemony
Abstract

Hegemony is by now the most widely used concept of all those found in the Prison Notebooks and developed
there by Gramsci. The first use in the Notebooks occurs very early on, purely in the sense of a political
hegemony exercised by the so-called “Moderates” in the Risorgimento. There is no unique meaning attached
to “hegemony” but an oscillation between a narrow “leadership” as contrasted with “domination” and a
broader one which includes both “leadership” and “domination”, leading the allied classes or groups and
dominating the opposing ones: in Gramsci’s words, the “ ‘normal’ exercise of hegemony” is characterized by a
“combination of force and consent”. Hegemony is exercised across a variety of fields – not solely political as in
the first use of the term, but “political-intellectual”, “intellectual, moral and political”, “politico-cultural” and
“cultural”. And the content of political hegemony “must be predominantly of an economic order”. The
intellectuals, as defined and discussed by Gramsci in the Notebooks, occupy a particular role in the exercise of
hegemony in society by the dominant group and in the domination over society embodied by the State. In a
struggle for hegemony, a subaltern group must go beyond the economic-corporative phase, to advance to
“political-intellectual hegemony in civil society and become dominant in political society”. Hegemony is
intimately connected with democracy, such that in a hegemonic system “there is democracy between the
leading groups and the groups that are led”.
[N.b. All footnotes in Cospito’s contribution are editorial additions; other editorial additions in the text are
given in square brackets, whereas curly brackets are used to indicate the author’s textual abbreviations.]
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Gramsci Dictionary / Dizionario gramsciano:
Hegemony
Giuseppe Cospito
The first occurrence of the lemma “hegemony” appears in
Q1§44, QdC p. 41 [in English PN Vol. 1, p. 137],1 where we meet
the expression “ ‘political hegemony’ ”, introduced by Gramsci in
inverted commas to indicate the particular connotation, as compared with the generic meaning of “pre-eminence”, “supremacy”,
found when following up after the continuation of the same note,
ending in the constitution of an extremely broad spectrum of
meanings in various contexts ranging from the economic to
literature, from religion to anthropology, from psychology to
linguistics. We are moreover dealing with distinctions which, to use
Gramscian terminology, are “methodological” and not “organic”
(cf. Q13§18, QdC p. 1590 [SPN, p. 160]), as comes over clearly right
up to the last occurrence of the term (Q29§3, QdC p. 2346):
Every time the question of language surfaces {…} it means that a series of
other problems are coming to the fore: the formation and enlargement of the
governing class, the need to establish more intimate and secure relationships
between the governing groups and the national-popular masses, in other words
to reorganize the cultural hegemony [SCW, pp. 183-4].

Cultural hegemony which in its turn must not be contraposed to
political hegemony, as evidenced by the use of expressions such as
“politico-cultural hegemony”, “political-intellectual” and “intellectual, moral and political” hegemonies, and similar ones, in addition
to the thesis according to which “the philosophy of praxis conceives the reality of human relationships of knowledge as an element of political ‘hegemony’” (Q10II§6, QdC p. 1245 [FSPN, p. 306]).
PN will be used to indicate Joseph Buttigieg’s English translation of Gerratana’s Critical
Edition of 1975 (QdC in the text) for the Columbia University Press, New York (Vols. 1, 2 and
3 published in 1992, 1996 and 2007 respectively). SPN will be used to refer in the text to
Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, 1971; SCW for
Selections from Cultural Writings, ed. D. Forgacs and G. Nowell-Smith, trans. W. Q. Boelhower,
1985; and FSPN for Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. D. Boothman, ,
1995. The last three volumes are all published in London by Lawrence and Wishart.
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As regards the meaning to be attached to the term “hegemony”,
from the start (Q1§44, QdC p. 41) Gramsci oscillates between a
more restricted sense of “leadership”, contraposed to “domination”, and a broader one that includes both (leadership plus
domination). Indeed he writes that a
class is dominant in two ways, namely it is “leading” and “dominant”. It
leads the allied classes, it dominates the opposing classes. Therefore, a class can
(and must) “lead” even before assuming power; when it is in power it becomes
dominant but it also continues to “lead” [PN Vol. 1, p. 136-7].

The oscillation continues in the following notes, thereby creating
not a few difficulties of interpretation, which may be resolved at
least in part by reference to the context. In Q1§48, QdC p. 59 [PN
Vol. 1, pp. 155-6], for example a distinction is drawn between the
“‘normal’ exercise of hegemony on the now classic terrain of the
parliamentary regime […] characterized by a combination of force
and consent which balance each other” (hegemony as leadership
plus domination), and situations in which “the hegemonic
apparatus cracks and the exercise of hegemony becomes ever more
difficult” (hegemony vs. domination). Such situations, defined there
as a “crisis of the principle of authority” - “dissolution of the
parliamentary regime” and later as an “organic crisis” or explicitly
as a “crisis of hegemony” (Q13§23, QdC p. 1603 [SPN, p. 210]),
may be assimilated to those in which the State is not fully
developed; such was the case of the United States, in which
(Q1§61, QdC p. 72 [PN Vol. 1, p. 169]) “hegemony is born in the
factory and does not need so many political and ideological
intermediaries”, since “there has not yet been (except sporadically,
perhaps) any ‘superstructural’ blossoming; therefore, the fundamental question of hegemony has not yet been posed”. In Q6§10,
QdC p. 692 [PN Vol. 3, p. 10] Gramsci was to say that “America
has yet to surpass overcome the economic-corporative phase,
which Europe traversed during the Middle Ages”; in Q8§185, QdC
p. 1053, the judgment is extended to any new State form:
If it is true that no type of State can avoid passing through a phase of
economic-corporative primitivism, one can deduce that the content of {…}
political hegemony {…} must be predominantly of an economic order [PN
Vol. 3, p. 342].
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The terrain on which the “struggle for hegemony” takes place is
that of civil society (Q4§46, QdC p. 473 [PN Vol. 2, p. 197]). The
relation between hegemony and civil society had already been dealt
with in some detail in Q4§38, pp. 457-60, devoted to the “Relations
between structure and superstructures”. In this paragraph Gramsci
distinguishes between three moments: the first is “closely linked to
the structure”; the second “is the political ‘relation of forces’”; the
third is the “relation of military forces”. The second moment passes
through different phases, culminating in the
most patently “political” phase {…} in which previously germinated
ideologies come into contact and confrontation with one another, until only
one of them – or, at least, a single combination of them – tends to prevail, to
dominate, to spread across the entire field, bringing about, in addition to
economic and political unity, intellectual and moral unity, not on a corporate
but on a universal level, of hegemony [PN Vol. 2, pp. 179-83].

At this point the group that up to then had been subaltern can
leave behind “the economic-corporate phase in order to advance to
the phase of political-intellectual hegemony in civil society and
become dominant in political society”. This subject is developed
especially in Notebook 6 (Q6§24, QdC p. 703 [PN Vol. 3, p. 20 and
FSPN, p. 75] where Gramsci is at pains to indicate the “sense it
{civil society} is often used in these notes (that is, in the sense of
the political and cultural hegemony of a social group over the whole
of society)”; in Q6§81, QdC p. 751 [PN Vol. 3, p. 64; SPN p. 245],
even from the title we see the nexus that is formulated between
Hegemony (civil society) and the separation of powers. In Q7§83, QdC p.
914 [PN Vol. 3, p. 213], speaking of “what is called ‘public
opinion’” Gramsci notes that this “is tightly connected to political
hegemony, in other words it is the point of contact between ‘civil
society’ and ‘political society’, between consent and force”. As
compared with the previous identification between hegemony and
civil society, the apparent contradiction is resolved by taking into
account the polysemy of the two concepts and that of State: in a
series of notes, in fact, Gramsci intends “State = political society +
civil society, that is, hegemony protected by the armor of coercion”
(Q6§88, 763-4 [PN Vol. 3, pp. 75-6; SPN, p. 262-3]). In another
group of notes devoted to the critique of Croce’s ethico-political
history, read as an attempted, albeit partial and unilateral,
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‘translation’ of the concept of hegemony, Gramsci on the other
hand opposes the excessive contraposition between “the aspect of
history that is related to ‘civil society’, to hegemony” and “the
aspect of history related to state-governmental initiative” (Q7§9,
QdC p. 858 [PN Vol. 3, p. 161]), and insists on hegemony as the
element that forms the juncture between civil society and political
society. Moreover, different from Croce, the refusal to contrapose
the two aspects does not imply their crude identification, as proposed by Gentile, for whom Gramsci claims (Q6§10, QdC p. 691)
hegemony and dictatorship are indistinguishable, force is no different from
consent; it is impossible to distinguish political society from civil society; only
the State exists and of course the State-as-government” [PN Vol. 3, p. 10]).

However at the moment when Gentile’s position is unmasked as
a mere hypostatization of the totalitarian regime imposed by the
Fascist Party, Gramsci distinguishes between situations in which
“the given party is bearer of a new culture and one has a progressive phase” from others in which “the party in question wants to prevent another force, bearer of a new culture, from becoming itself
‘totalitarian’ – this is an objectively regressive and reactionary phase”
(Q6§136, QdC p. 800 [PN Vol. 3, p. 108]). The difference between
fascist totalitarianism and communist totalitarianism consists therefore in the fact that while the former tends to reabsorb civil society
within the State, reducing hegemony to force, in the latter,
it is possible to imagine the State-coercion element withering away gradually, as the increasingly conspicuous elements of regulated society (or ethical
State or civil society) assert themselves. {…} In the theory of the State →
regulated society (from a phase in which State equals Government to a phase in
which State is identified with civil society), there must be a transition phase of
the State as night watchman, that is of a coercive organization that will protect
the development of those elements of regulated society that are continually on
the rise and, precisely, because they are on the rise, will gradually reduce the
State’s authoritarian and coercive interventions

up to “an era of organic freedom” (Q6§88, QdC p. 763-4 [PN Vol. 3,
pp. 75-6; SPN, p. 263]). Starting from Q6§138, QdC p. 802 [PN Vol.
3, p. 109], Gramsci describes the long struggle to install this new
model of social organization with the concept of the war of position,
which requires “an unprecedented concentration of hegemony”. In
Q8§52, QdC p. 973 [PN Vol. 3, p. 266], this strategy is contraposed
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to Trotsky’s strategy of the permanent revolution: the “1848 concept of the war of movement is precisely the concept of permanent
revolution: in politics the war of position is the concept of hegemony”.
As for the protagonists of this war, in the initial stage of
Gramsci’s prison reflections, his attention seems centred on the
class. In Q1§44, QdC p. 40 we read that
the whole problem of the various political currents of the Risorgimento
{…} is reducible to the following basic fact: that the Moderates represented a
relatively homogeneous class, and therefore their leadership underwent
relatively limited oscillations, whereas the Action Party did not found itself
specifically upon any historical class and the oscillations which its leading
organs underwent resolved themselves, in the last analysis, according to the
interests of the Moderates [PN Vol. 1, p. 136].

This is a vision that, in presupposing a somewhat mechanical
nexus between the structure and the superstructure, would reduce
the struggle for hegemony to an epiphenomenon of the class
struggle on the terrain of the relations of production. Afterwards,
Gramsci would attenuate this rigidity, writing in Q6§200, QdC pp.
839-40 that in
the development of a national class, one must take into account not only the
process of its formation within the economic sphere, but also its parallel growth
in the ideological, juridical, religious, intellectual, philosophical, spheres etc.
{…}. Still every movement that is the bearer of a ‘thesis’ leads to movements of
‘antithesis’ and {then} to partial and provisional ‘syntheses’ [PN Vol. 3, p. 143].

In the meantime Gramsci had developed a further agent of hegemonic influence, represented by the intellectual. Already tangible as
from the note of Q1§44, QdC p. 41 [PN Vol. 1, p. 137], where the
leaders of the moderate party were defined as “organic intellectuals”
or “condensed” ones, a “vanguard” of their own class; as from
Q4§49 (QdC pp. 474-84 [PN Vol. 2, p. 199-210]) the weight of the
intellectuals assumes a notable increase equally with the extension of
the concept itself, up to the point of including not only professional,
industrial, scientific, ecclesiastical, clerical intellectuals and so on,
concluding in the second draft (Q12§1, QdC p. 1516 [SPN, p. 9])
that “all men are intellectuals”, even though “not all men have in
society the function of intellectuals”. As from the A text [a first
draft text – tr. note] of Q4§49, QdC p. 476, Gramsci attributes to
the intellectuals
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a function in the ‘hegemony’ that is exercised through-out society by the
dominant group and in the “domination” over society that is embodied by the
State and this function is precisely “organizational” or “connective” [PN Vol.
2, p. 200].

The study of the role of the intellectuals as “functionaries” or, as
he was to say in the C text, [the second draft text – tr. note] (Q12§1,
QdC p. 1519 [SPN, p. 12]) “the dominant group’s ‘deputies’
exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political
government”, involves going into detail into another subject
sketched out in Q1, viz. hegemonic apparatuses or systems: first of all this
means the scholastic system in the broadest meaning of the term,
from the moment when (Q10II§44, QdC p. 1331 [SPN, p. 350])
“every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogical
relationship”; thus, journalistic undertakings, the legal organizations
– repressive and non-repressive – but also, as noted in Q8§179, QdC
p. 1049 [PN Vol. 3, p. 338}, “numerous other so-called private
initiatives and activities” including “charitable institutions and
legacies to charity” (Q14§56, QdC p. 1715 [FSPN, p. 154}). The
progressive loss of importance of class, compared to intellectuals, in
the exercise of hegemony, to be correlated to his frequent
substitution of ‘group’ or ‘social grouping’ (e.g. in his rewritten
version of Q1§44 (QdC pp. 40-54 [PN Vol. 1, pp. 136-54]) in
Q19§24 ({QdC esp. pp. 2010-11} [SPN, esp. pp. 57-9]), makes it
possible to establish a less mechanical connection between the
economic plane and the hegemonic one; it is indeed true, as one
reads in Q4§49, QdC pp. 474-6, that
every social group, coming into existence on the primal basis of an essential
function in the world of economic production creates together with itself,
organically, a rank or several ranks of intellectuals;

however,
the relationship between the intellectuals and production is not as direct as
in the case of the fundamental social groups, but mediated {…} by two types
of social organization: (a) by civil society {…} {and} (b) by the State

as well as by the existence of “pre-existing categories of
intellectuals” which represent “a historical continuity uninterrupted
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even by the most complicated changes of social and political
forms” [PN Vol. 2, pp. 199 and 200]2.
One must, moreover, consider the progressive emergence, starting with Q5§127, QdC p. 662 [PN Vol. 2, p. 382}, of the role of the
party understood as the “modern Prince”, from the moment that
“in reality in certain States, the ‘head of State’ {…} is precisely the
‘political party’” which holds “de facto power”, and exercises the hegemonic and thus the equilibrating function between different interests
in “civil society”. The party presents itself as the bearer of a new
model of substantial democracy, different from the previous one, if
not totally antithetic as compared with the formal parliamentary one,
as is demonstrated in a series of late notes in which this latter is revalued in contraposition to tacit or implicit “black parliamentarism”, represented by fascist corporativism but which may also be
imputed to Stalin’s regime (“the self-criticism of self-criticism”, the
“liquidation” of Trotsky and so on: Q14§74 and Q14§76), in which
it is clear that “care must be taken to exclude the slightest appearance of support for ‘absolutist’ tendencies” [SPN, pp. 255-7].3 This
allows Gramsci to create a nexus (Q8§191, QdC p. 1056) between
Hegemony and Democracy. Among the many meanings of democracy, the most
realistic and concrete one, in my view, is that which can be brought into relief
through the connection between democracy and the concept of hegemony. In
the hegemonic system, there is democracy between the leading groups and the
groups that are led [PN Vol. 3, p. 345; see also SPN, footnote on p. 56].

This is the particular meaning attached by Gramsci to
“democratic centralism”, which “consists in a critical research […]
to separate out the ‘international’ and ‘unitary’ element in national
and localistic reality” (Q9§68, QdC, p. 1140).4 Gramsci returns to
this nexus between the national and international elements in
paragraphs leading up to Q14§68, QdC p. 1729 [SPN, pp. 240-41]:
“To be sure, the line of development is towards internationalism,
but the point of departure is ‘national’ {…}. It is in the concept of
hegemony that those exigencies are knotted together”.
Readers may wish to compare this with its well-known second draft in Q12§1 that begins
the text of the SPN volume (pp. 5-7).
3 Here, in line with the manuscript of the Quaderni, the plural “tendencies” is written, rather
than the singular of the SPN translation.
4 Cf. the second draft of this passage, included with rewrites of other previous paragraphs,
now in Q13§36 (SPN, pp. 185-90: here pp. 189-90).
2

24

International Gramsci Journal No. 9 (2nd Series /Seconda Serie) December /Dicembre 2018

The centrality of the role of the party in the struggle for hegemony
makes the relationship between the structural plane and the superstructural ones less mechanical; moreover, as from Q7§24, QdC p.
871, Gramsci has recourse precisely to the concept of hegemony to
combat
the assumption (put forward as an essential postulate of historical materialism) that one can present and explain every political and ideological fluctuation
as a direct expression of the structure [PN Vol. 3, p. 173].

From this stems the critique of any economistic interpretation of
historical materialism, which becomes ever more stringent as
Gramsci realizes how widespread this is and what sort of obstacle it
represents on the way towards the attainment of ideological
hegemony by the philosophy of praxis. Different, for example,
from the claim in Q4§14, QdC p. 436, that “historical materialism is
not subjected to hegemonies, it has itself started to exercise a
hegemony over the old intellectual world” [PN Vol. 2, p. 156], in
Q16§9, QdC p. 1860-61 – in an innovation as compared with the
first draft text of Q4§3 – Gramsci here instead recognizes that this
is the conception of a subaltern social group, deprived of historical
initiative, in continuous but disorganised expansion, unable to go beyond a
certain qualitative level, which still remains below the level of the possession of
the State and of the real exercise of hegemony over the whole of society [SPN,
p. 396].

It is not, then, for Gramsci a question of going beyond the
horizon of Marxism, so much as returning to the original sources:
hence the attribution, beginning with Q4§38, p. 465 [PN Vol. 2, p.
187], of the paternity of the very concept of hegemony, which
indeed represents “Ilyich’s greatest contribution to Marxist philosophy, to historical materialism: an original and creative contribution”. And it is precisely through Lenin that Gramsci returns to
Marx: in Q10II§41X, QdC p. 1315, again with an innovation as
compared with the first draft text, he in fact writes that already in
Marx there is “contained in a nutshell the ethico-political aspect of
politics or theory of hegemony and consent, as well as the aspect of
force and of the economy” [FSPN, p. 399].5
5 The last word in the original (economia) could also be interpreted “economics”, in the sense
of subjection to “economic laws”, the choice which was made in FSPN.

25

